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ROMAN LAW AS A POLITICAL AGENDA
Mathias Reimann*
THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN ROMANTIC ERA. By
James Q. Whitman. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990.
Pp. xix, 281. $39.50.

According to traditional legal historiography, the Roman law's
modem significance lies in its huge role in shaping the civil law. Since
its revival in the medieval universities, first in Italy and then all over
Europe, the Roman law was the primary intellectual training ground
for civil lawyers and provided much of the substance of modem codifications. More recently, this became particularly evident in the spectacular renaissance of Roman law in nineteenth-century Germany,
where the law professors of Friedrich Carl von Savigny's historical
school and Georg Friedrich Puchta's conceptual jurisprudence analyzed and systematized the Roman law more intensely than ever
before. 1 Enshrined in their treatises, Roman law became the common
law of the German-speaking countries of Europe and influenced modem civil law on a truly worldwide scale.2
In The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era, Professor Whitman transcends this established view by considering the
Roman law from a different perspective. He does not directly take
issue with the traditional perception; rather, he takes it by and large
for granted. 3 But he laments that legal (and other) historians "have
too often shown themselves to be uninterested in exploring the place of
Roman legal scholarship in German cultural and political life in general" (p. xi). Thus he looks at the Roman law in a broader context
and finds that its importance went beyond the realm of law proper. It
was also a powerful political and cultural ideology.
As Professor Whitman of course recognizes, this approach is not
completely new. Almost half a century ago, Paul Koschaker reflected

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Dr. iur. 1982, University of Freiburg; LL.M.
1983, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. See F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 377-416, 430-58 (2d ed.
1967); Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REv. 837, 858-71 (1990).
2. A. SCHWARTZ, Einjliisse deutscher Zivilistik im Auslande, in RECHTSGESCHICHTE UND
GEGENWART (H. Thieme & F. Wieacker eds.) in 13 FREIBURGER REcHTS-UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFrLICHE ABHANDLUNGEN 26 (1960).
3. He disputes traditional views on a few occasions, for example, with regard to the
Romanists' conception of property (p. 166), but a critique of established views is not his primary
goal.
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broadly upon the Roman law as a cultural phenomenon.4 But the precise meaning and impact of the Roman law as a political and cultural
ideology, particularly in its heyday in nineteenth-century Germany,
has never been explored. By undertaking such an exploration, Professor Whitman has written an important book that deserves the attention not only of legal historians but of all who have an interest in the
culture and politics of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany in
particular, and of Europe in general.
To explore the Roman law from this perspective is a challenging
task because it requires both technical understanding of the Roman
law itself and a contextual approach to its role in history - in other
words, it requires a lawyer as well as a historian. Professor Whitman
is both, and he often weaves analyses of Roman legal doctrine into the
broader fabric of history. His success in this endeavor varies,5 but the
overall result is a subtle and complex study of an intriguing and difficult subject. 6 The book offers, in a lively style,7 a new and colorful
picture of the Roman law and its proponents in the nineteenth
century.
Professor Whitman paints his picture by doing two things at the
same time - telling a story and presenting a thesis. Professor Whitman blends story and thesis together, but in this review I separate
them because the former is rather straightforward while the latter invites debate. I first summarize the story, the tale of the learned professors (Part I), and then consider Professor Whitman's main thesis that
the Roman law was a political agenda (Part II) pursued by these at
times very powerful scholars. This thesis raises questions of proof and
plausibility (Part III), and answering them helps to identify more
clearly the book's strengths and weaknesses (Part IV).

I.

THE TALE OF THE LEARNED PROFESSORS

As a story, Professor Whitman's book is the tale of the learned
4. P. KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UNO DAS RoMISCHE RECHT (1947) (cited on p. x).
5. See infra Part III, notes 19-20, 22-26 and accompanying text.
6. The book is based on thorough research using primary sources from German archives and
libraries as well as a wealth of English, German, and Italian secondary literature.
7. The style suffers, however, from the extensive use of "-isms." Professor Whitman drives
this bad habit characteristic of current scholarship in the humanities to extremes. Characterizing
trends and movements as "-isms" is by and large acceptable, as in the case of "codificationism"
(pp. 54, 217), but expressions like "third-way-ism" (p. 95), or "Febronianism" (p. 78 n.52) are
awkward. Referring to attitudes or ideas of persons in this manner is worse, and few of the
characters in Professor Whitman's tale escape this fate. Whatever one thinks of "Melanchthonianism" (p. 42), "Lipsianism" (p. 57), "Montesqieuianism" (p. 76 n.40), or "Schellingianism" (p.
215 n.70), certainly "Savignyan Niebuhrianism" (p. 160) is a stylistic monster. These "isms" are
not only aesthetic nuisances, but they also cause vagueness and confusion. Given the complexity
of Niebuhr's as well as Savigny's thought, I have, frankly, not much of an idea, what exactly
"Savignyan Niebuhrianism" (in contrast to "Zacharia's Niebuhrianism," p. 160) means. It im·
plies much learning but conveys little useful information.

May 1991]

Roman Law as a Political Agenda

1681

Roman law professors' repeated rise and fall, taking us from the age of
reformation to the late nineteenth century. Whitman's account emphasizes the function of Roman law in society and the professors' perception of their own position and responsibility as its keepers. The
story's main theme is the revival of a sixteenth-century tradition in the
Romantic era.
Professor Whitman sees the origins of this tradition in the concept
of "Law in the Fourth Monarchy of Melanchthon." 8 In the age of
reformation, Melanchthon and Luther looked for a law of peace for all
society. For two reasons, they believed the Roman law was the answer. First, Roman law was universal throughout the Empire and
thus not tied to particular interests. As the ius commune, Roman law
was the law common to all and thus promised impartiality. Second,
Roman law was connected, since the Middle Ages, with the public
peace movement.9 As the law of peace, it promised to overcome public disorder. The professors, as the Roman law's represe~tatives,
could thus, like their ancient and medieval predecessors, establish a
"corporate tradition" as the impartial arbiters of social conflict and as
the bringers of public peace.
A variety of political and intellectual changes in the early modem
age led to a "Decline of the Roman-Law Corporate Tradition in the
Eighteenth Century" (pp. 41-65). The consolidation of modem nation
states broke up the Empire and destroyed the prevalence of the ius
commune, which was preempted by princely legislation and eventually
replaced by enlightened codification. In the age of reason of the eighteenth century, the social function of Roman law was disregarded; Roman law was conceived merely as a collection of timeless maxims of
legal truth. Thus the professors found themselves degraded from independent arbiters and peace bringers to Fiirstendiener, mere lawyers
under the absolutist princes.
But the old tradition of equating Roman law with the law of peace
for all society returned with the "Imperial Revival in the First Romantic Decade and the Discovery of the Antonines" (pp. 66-91). As
the ancien regime withered and the power of the princes declined towards the end of the eighteenth century, the imperial tradition was
revived. The Roman law regained prestige as the law of neutrality and
peace, and the professors regained their status as its independent and
socially prestigious keepers. Likening themselves to the great jurists

s:

Pp. 3-40. The title of this chapter refers to Melanchthon's view of Rome as the last of the
Four Monarchies in the Book of Daniel, as Professor Whitman duly explains. P. 4.
9. Professor Whitman sees this connection primarily in the constitutional reform of 1495,
i.e., the Ewiger Landfrieden. the Perpetual Land-Peace, and the establishment of the Reichskammergericht, the Imperial Court. Pp. 10-14. Whether the Imperial Court Ordinance (Reichs·
Kammergerichtsordnung) of 1495 referred to the common (Roman) law because it was considered the law of peace is surely open to debate.
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under the Antonine emperors, 10 they rose from Fti'rstendiener to
Staatsdiener, from servants of the prince to servants of the state, and
thus of the public interest.
This revival reached its high-water mark in the second and third
decade of the new century. Hence, in its central chapter, "The Imperial Tradition and the New Professoriate after 1814" (pp. 92-150), the
book describes the Romantic period as the "professorial age" (p. 101).
Leading academics like Savigny and Puchta, Thibaut, and Welcker
sought to revive the corporate tradition of the Holy Roman Empire in
a variety of ways 11 in order to overcome the remnants of absolutism
and feudalism. Their plans for political and social reforms by and
large failed, but their efforts to regain prominence and influence for
themselves were, at least temporarily, successful. As a result of their
revivalist efforts, the "Roman law professoriate became a political
force in post-Napoleonic Germany" (p. 93).
This professoriate, Professor Whitman tells us, did not confine its
attention to grand jurisprudential questions. Instead, these scholars
deeply involved themselves in pressing social issues of their time. Using their "High Cultural Tradition as an Instrument for Reform" (pp.
151-99), they tackled theAgralfrage-the issue of how to abolish the
remnants of feudal landholding in the early nineteenth-century German countryside. Although their success was very limited, Whitman
believes these efforts demonstrated the scholars' belief that Roman law
could ensure a peaceful transition from a feudalist to a liberal social
order. 12
Despite their efforts, the revived corporate tradition of the Roman
law professors as the keepers of the ius commune and as the bringers
of social peace was not to last. The Romantic era was followed by a
time of "Cultural Crisis and Legal Change After 1840" (pp. 200-28).
In the sharpened conflicts of the Vormiirz period, the monarchial reaction took over as the Germanists launched their assault on the Roman
law, criticizing it as alien to the German culture and indeed as an
instrument of despotism. After 1850, materialism replaced romanticism and classicism as intellectual life focused on commerce and industry and became dominated by the paradigms of the natural
sciences. In this new world and to its inhabitants like Mommsen and
Jhering, Roman law was no longer a grand corporate and imperial
tradition but the law of a marketplace dominated by laissez-faire.
Jhering's mostly ill-fated attempts to use the ancient sources as a basis
for modem commercial law illustrated his continuing admiration for
Roman law, but it was admiration of "systematic consistency and pre10. The Rome of the Antonines stands more generally for the period of peace and prosperity
in the second century A.D.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
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cision,"1 3 not of a cultural tradition.
When the General German Commercial Code14 was promulgated
in 1861, the trend towards pervasive codification had become irreversible. It was also the year of Savigny's death. In the book's conclusion
(pp. 229-43), Professor Whitman briefly considers the period after this
date and finds that the political Roman law professors - and with
them the visions of a revivified past - vanished towards the end of
the nineteenth century. And when the Civil Code superceded the Digest as the fundamental text of German private law in 1900, it ended a
period of half a millennium in which the professors had had primary
control over the basic source of law. 15
Many elements of this story are familiar to a student of German
legal history, but this does not mean that the story is banal. Professor
Whitman draws new and intriguing connections between major periods of German legal history by linking nineteenth-century scholars to
their sixteenth-century predecessors as well as to the ancient jurists.
He skillfully illuminates this connection by several pervasive themes.
The book shows, for example, how some Roman law professors of the
modem age linked their own claims to status as ·authoritative interpreters to the ius respondendi of the ancient jurists - the right to give
officially binding answers to legal questions. And it shows that while
many of these modem scholars regarded Rome and its law as their
model, they saw very different things in it. To Melanchthon and Luther, it was a universal empire in which peace could prevail; to eighteenth-century thinkers, Rome meant the reign of Augustus as the
enlightened prince who saved Rome from chaos; to Hugo, Rome was
the glorious period of the Antonines; and to Jhering, Rome was a laissez-faire society and economy. The view depended on the expectations and needs of the viewer. And yet Rome remained the lodestar of
jurisprudence.
Themes like these hold Professor Whitman's story together; they
make it coherent, rich in perspectives, and highly interesting in its own
right. But ultimately, he writes the story in order to make a distinct
point about the professoriate of the Romantic era itself.

II.

ROMAN LAW AS A POLITICAL PROGRAM

At its most general level, Professor Whitman's thesis is that, to the
legal academics of the Romantic period, the Roman law was not
13. P. 232 (quoting John, The Politics of Legal Unity in Germany, 1870-1896, 28 HIST. J.
341, 350 (1985)).
14. DAS ALLGEMEINE DEUTSCHE HANDELSGESETZBUCH (1861).
15. Professor Whitman's statement that with codification "interpretive authority passed to
the class of the judges" (p. 229) is likely, however, to mislead the reader. The scholars did not
lose all of this authority, as a look at the commentaries on the Civil Code and at the treatises on
German private law amply illustrates even today. It is more accurate to say that after codification the judges had a greater share of the interpretive authority over the basic text than before.
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merely a matter of jurisprudence but also a political program and a
social vision. If we truly want to understand these academics, we
must thus look beyond their well-known disputes about codification
and legal science. We must understand that they believed in their, and
the Roman law's, capability to bring about the much-needed reforms
of German society in a peaceful way.
The meaning of Whitman's thesis becomes clear only in the context of the political and social situation in early nineteenth-century
Germany. Although Professor Whitman does not elaborate on this
context, 16 recalling it will help to reveal the essence of the book. In
the Romantic period, Germany found itself in an uneasy situation for
which France was responsible in a dual sense. First, the revolution
and the fall of the ancien regime in France had made it clear that the
days of the old politically absolutist and socially feudal order were
numbered in Germany as well. Second, Napoleon's armies had first
overrun and then occupied Germany and shattered much of this old
order before the Germans could change it themselves. As a result, the
need for social and political reform was clear. What form it would
take, however, was not. On the one hand, the bourgeoisie was becoming too self-assertive and the people had gained too much national
pride and self-confidence in the wars against Napoleon to let the
princes retain absolute power. On the other hand, populism and democracy were widely discredited by the bloody excesses of the French
Revolution itself.
In this situation, Professor Whitman tells us, the Roman law
professors "claim[ed] for themselves a new role as national leaders"
(p. 101). In other words, they consciously sought to navigate a German society caught between the Scylla of despotic absolutism and the
Charybdis of violent populism to the quiet waters of gradual and
peaceful reform. Because they considered themselves heirs of a past
the revival of which could solve the problems of the present, they believed to have "all the resources necessary to carry Germany safely
into the post-French Revolutionary world" (p. 112).
Professor Whitman's thesis is more specifically that the revivalism
of these professors was focused on really two internally connected eras
in the past. The Roman law scholars saw themselves as representatives of the sixteenth-century German tradition. And they sought to
bring the social and political order of ancient Rome back to life.
First, the Roman law professors were "lawyers who thought of
themselves as revivers of the sixteenth century" (p. ix), of the Roman
law that had stood for political neutrality and social peace.
It was this political revival of the traditions of the Holy Roman Empire,
a revival deeply bound up with romantic yearnings for the pre-absolutist
16. This does not present a problem since Professor Whitman writes for an audience familiar
with German history.
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past, that allowed the Roman law professors to reassert their own sixteenth-century corporate tradition, and to present themselves to their
countrymen as an "impartial" alternative to the terrors of post-Napoleonic politics. [p. xv]

Like the professors of Luther's and Melanchthon's age, they wanted to
revive an order in which the "rule of law ... utterly excluded rule of
men, [a] legal order without the sovereignty of either Volk or Furst"
(p. 126) - in short, a Rechtsstaat under Roman law and its keepers.
The manner in which the professors pursued this goal varied regionally. In the strongly monarchial Prussian North, conservatives
like Savigny and Puchta demanded that academic jurists take the lead
in making and administering the law, leaving the legislator as well as
the judges in subordinate positions - a program first announced by
Savigny and then fully developed in Puchta's notion of a Juristenrecht. 11 They envisaged a politically conservative state in which
academic jurists developed the law through a historically and conceptually oriented legal science, thus gradually and peacefully reforming
society. Beneath their program lay the "hope that the charismatic Roman law professors, sheltered within the free universities, could form
the basis for a true spontaneous order that, in an odd way, represented
a kind of intellectual laissez-faire" (p. 111).
In the increasingly constitutionalist South, comparatively liberal
professors like Thibaut and Welcker sought a more limited but nevertheless highly important role for legal academics by supporting the
revival of the Aktenversendung. 18 They intended to employ the power
of the law faculties, to which the courts sent cases for decision of intricate legal questions, to protect liberal political activists persecuted by
the government (pp. 138-39). For professors like Thibaut, Welcker, or
Zacharia, theSpruchkollegien -the law faculties sitting as (appellate)
courts - were thus institutions of a Rechtsstaat in which impartial
Roman law professors would mete out impartial justice (pp. 139-46).
Their program, Professor Whitman tells us, was just as much an attempt to restore the old constitution of the sixteenth-century Holy Roman Empire as were Savigny's and Puchta's efforts. The respective
agendas were simply different versions of the same revivalism (pp. 9899).
Professor Whitman also is convinced that these academics shared
the wish to revive another more distant past. Through their sixteenth17. See G. PUCHTA, DAS GEWOHNHEITSRECHT (1828).
18. Allowed by article 12 of the Bundesacte of 1815. Pp. 135-36. "Aktenversendung" literally means "sending of the (case) file." The practice was widespread in the early modern age.
The court gathered the facts of the case, collected the relevant documents, and thus built a
dossier of the litigation. It then sent the whole record to a law faculty, the designated members
of which (the "Spruchkollegium," decisionmaking panel) gave an opinion on which party was
entitled to judgment. Thereafter the file was sent back to the court, which formally rendered the
judgment and pronounced it. Thus, law professors (of Roman law) performed the function of
judges. For more detail, see J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 200-07 (1968).
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century predecessors, they looked to the ancient jurists and to Imperial Rome. The law professors of the Romantic period saw themselves
also as representatives of "the political and social notions of Antiquity" (p. 98). In their view, the peaceful and prosperous reign of the
Antonine emperors could serve as a model for post-Napoleonic Germany. The early nineteenth-century law professors were thus "motivated ... by the conviction that they could somehow restore Roman
social relations through a restoration of Roman law" (p. xv). To be
sure, scholars like Savigny and Puchta on the one hand, and Welcker
and Zacharia on the other hand, may have disagreed as to what that
meant. They were nevertheless part of the same revivalist tradition
because "they shared a conviction that German society could be
remade on the model of Rome" (p. 150).
In sum, Professor Whitman portrays Savigny and his academic
colleagues as united under the cause of a dual revivalism. Regardless
of their political differences, they all
harbored the same hope, that the Roman-law professorial tradition
could, on the one hand, infuse political life with the strength and free
sensibility of old corporate society, and, on the other hand, lend a sense
of moral mission to the Germans, a sense drawn from the grandeur of
the classical tradition. [p. 99]

This view of the German law professoriate of the Romantic period as a
guild united in pursuit of a common political agenda is novel and intriguing. But is it correct?
III.

PROOF AND PLAUSIBILITY

Perhaps. The answer, however, is by no means clear or easy because the support Professor Whitman presents for his view is sometimes not wholly convincing. To be sure, Whitman need not offer
unequivocal proof for his case, such as overt acknowledgments or acts
by which the people under consideration clearly demonstrate that they
intended what the author claims they did. Support can also consist of
inferences that the author draws from other phenomena. But even
granting these options, Professor Whitman's account is open to challenge. The overt acts and assertions he relies on are rarely clear proof
for the correctness of his interpretation, and the inferences he draws
from more general phenomena are sometimes not entirely plausible.
In evaluating the evidence he presents, we must distinguish between the various elements of his thesis; some are well supported,
others are not. As Part II of this review has shown, Professor Whitman's characterization of the professors as revivalists with a conscious
political agenda contains at least two major claims, each of which in
tum encompasses several minor points. First, he portrays the legal
academics of the Romantic era as "deeply conscious" (p. 98) of the
past, by which he means that they considered themselves the modem
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representatives of the sixteenth-century tradition on the one hand and
of ancient Rome on the other hand. And second, he goes further and
attributes to them a conscious and common political agenda, that is, a
desire actually to revivify both the German preabsolutist corporate
tradition and the social order of antiquity.
The first claim, that the Roman lawyers, in the north as well as in
the south, all saw themselves as heirs both of sixteenth-century Germany and of second-century Rome, is questionable because of its generality. There is support for some of its aspects, but virtually none for
others.
The Romanists in the Prussian north, notably Savigny and Puchta,
clearly considered Rome "the model society of scholarly lawmaking"
(p. 128). This is well documented throughout their writings to which
Professor Whitman refers (pp. 125-31), but it is not new or surprising.
It is also legitimate to regard the southern professors' enthusiasm for
the institution of Aktenversendung as a conscious endorsement of
preabsolutist constitutional traditions (pp. 131-48). Although the record here is more mixed, 19 at least some of the leading thinkers about a
new Rechtsstaat like Zachariae, and maybe even Thibaut, Welcker,
and von Mohl, probably saw a connection between the old constitution and their own time (pp. 81, 140-43).
But Professor Whitman fails to support sufficiently the less obvious
dimensions of this (first) claim. He demonstrates neither that the
southerners had great enthusiasm for ancient Rome, nor that the
northerners considered themselves heirs of the sixteenth century.
There is virtually no evidence in the book that scholars like Welcker,
Zacharia, or Thibaut saw themselves, like Savigny and Puchta, as the
proud and legitimate successors of Ulpian, Paulus, or Julian. 20 What
evidence is presented actually indicates the contrary. As Professor
Whitman admits, many southern academics were blatantly hostile towards Roman law (pp. 131-34). And they saw the Spruchkol/egien
primarily as the equivalent of the Schiippenstiihle, 21 not of the ius
respondendi - that is, they saw the Spruchkol/egien as a medieval
German, not an ancient Roman tradition.
The assertion that scholars in the Prussian north were highly conscious of the old sixteenth-century tradition is better supported. But
19. Thibaut and Welcker were, at least initially, opposed to Aktenversendung. Pp. 136-37.
20. At least not to a greater degree than all continental law professors had seen themselves as
the modern equivalents of the Roman jurists ever since the middle ages.
21. See the long quotation (p. 144) from A. REHBERG, DIE ERWARTUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN VON DEM BUND IHRER FORSrEN (1835). The "SchOppenstiihle" were, so to speak, the
(indigenous) German law equivalents of the (Romanist) "Spruchkollegien." In contrast to law
faculties at the universities, they consisted oflaymen without academic legal training, though not
without experience in legal affairs. They sat as a group of decisionmakers in major cities to
which judgments of lay courts in smaller towns and rural areas were frequently referred for
quasi-appellate review. See J. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 158-76.
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even here a good deal of skepticism is in order. Professor Whitman's
attempt to prove his point is ingenious but not compelling. The ideas
of Savigny and Puchta, he asserts, were formed by observing the legal
practice in Hesse and Hannover (pp. 112-14) where the traditional
preabsolutist ways of judging had never been disturbed by enlightened
codes, and where courts thus still followed both local custom and Roman law. Here, Professor Whitman argues, lay the origins of Savigny's and Puchta's ideas of the Volksgeist as the essence of law, an
essence which manifested itself in the people's customs but was then
cast into the form of legal rules by the Roman lawyers. "Savigny and
his followers acquired a sense of their own place in German society
from the use of scholarship in these countryside courts" (p. 119). To
be sure, this is possible in light of the parallels between the Volksgeist
theory and the practice in the Hannoverian courts, as the author sees
it. But the book does not show that it was in fact so. There is no hard
proof that either Savigny or Puchta considered these courts their
model. 22 Perhaps it is plausible to infer a link between local court
practice and Volksgeist theory with regard to Savigny, who grew up
and began his academic career in Hesse, and who was a friend of
Burchard Wilhelm Pfeiffer, who in turn wrote about the Hannoverian
courts. But the support for this inference is extremely weak. 23 And
certainly Puchta, who allegedly "always had one eye on the world of
Hannover" (pp. 121-22) and who allegedly derived his theory of the
Gewohnheitsrecht, (the development of) customary law, from it (pp.
120-24), had no significant connections with, nor any discernible interest in, that region. 24 As a result, the claim that "the legal order of this
Hannoverian Rechtsstaat provided Savigny and his followers with the
village tradition ... on which they could base their traditionalist program" (p. 120) rests primarily on speculation.
22. Professor Whitman does not cite any reference in their works to the legal order in Hannover or Hesse. There is also no reason to believe that either Savigny or Puchta had a particular
interest in the practice of such rural courts. Quite to the contrary, their works are marked by a
paucity of references to any sort of contemporary court practice.
23. Pfeiffer's importance for Savigny's ideas remains unclear. Professor Whitman asserts
that Pfeiffer "exercised direct influence on Savigny's thinking" (p. 131) but fails to explain how.
His documentation (p. 185 n.148) is limited to three references to Pfeiffer in the footnotes in
Savigny's System des heutigen riimischen Rechts, see 4 F. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN
RC>MISCHEN REcHTS 498 n.u, 504 n.bb & 505 n.dd (1841), and to Savigny's approval of Pfeiffer's
(much earlier) dissertation. But only one of the footnotes in the System refers to Pfeiffer's writing
about Hannoverian court practice, and it is not of great importance for Savigny's argument. Nor
is there any indication that Pfeiffer's dissertation had anything to do with the courts in the countryside of Hannover, see J. ROCKERT, IDEALISMUS, JURISPRUDENZ UND POLITIK BEi FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY 13 (1984). Professor Whitman's evidence thus does not prove any
significant link among rural court practice, Pfeiffer, and Savigny's fundamental ideas.
24. Puchta had studied and begun his academic career in Erlangen, and then became a professor in Munich. He did teach in Marburg (in Hesse) for two years, but this was merely a
stepping stone on his way to Leipzig and, finally, Berlin. Aside from occasional visits to Gottingen, Puchta had nothing to do with Hannover. G. KLEINHEYER & J. SCHRC>DER, DEUTSCHE
JURISTEN AUS FONF JAHRHUNDERTEN 206-09 (1976).
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In light of this record, Professor Whitman's (first) claim that all
Roman law scholars shared the same consciousness of the past seems
bold. It is more appropriate to conclude that, while they all felt connected to some distant past, they often had different eras in mind. Savigny and Puchta saw themselves in the tradition of ancient Rome
while Thibaut, Welcker, and Zachariae were probably more or less
conscious of the preabsolutist German constitution. But the converse,
the northerners' interest in the sixteenth century and the southerners'
affection for ancient Rome, are matters of doubt.
Professor Whitman's second major claim builds on the first, but
then goes beyond it. When he sees the Roman lawyers of the Romantic period on "campaigns for social change" (p. xv), he ascribes to
them the conscious attempt to revivify the sixteenth century as well as
the ancient legal and social order. But again, direct evidence is scarce,
and some of the inferences are dubious.
The extent to which these Roman lawyers really wanted to bring
back the sixteenth-century Imperial Constitution remains unclear. Of
course, one may see their striving for independence from the princes
and for public influence as an attempt to reestablish their old position
in society. But that hardly amounts to embracing the sixteenth-century constitution in any more general sense. And of course, one can
interpret the revival of the old institution of Aktenversendung as an
effort to return to preabsolutist times. But even among the
southerners, the enthusiasm for Aktenversendung varied greatly
among the various scholars and over time; there is very little hard
proof that any of them supported it out of love for the past rather than
out of a felt necessity in the present. Although it may very well be that
Savigny, who believed that Aktenversendung could render "most excellent services" (p. 109), felt a vague Romantic love for the old institution, that does not mean that he, or for that matter Puchta or others,
therefore wanted to reestablish the political world of Melanchthon's
time. 25
It is equally questionable to assert broadly that these Roman lawyers wanted to "restore Roman social relations" (p. xv). This would
certainly be extremely surprising with regard to the southern liberal
professors. But, it is also a novel interpretation of Savigny and Puchta
- though, in light of their classicist attitude, a more reasonable one.
Professor Whitman, in fact, focuses on Savigny and Puchta (as well as
some other northerners). Indeed, his claim that scholars like Savigny
and Puchta consciously employed Roman law to bring antiquity back
25. Such revivalist ambitions are more likely in the case of the radical students in the Romantic Era, who wore the medieval student garb, as one can see in many paintings of Caspar
David Friedrich, the foremost German painter of the time. This traditional garb symbolized the
old, preabsolutist academic freedom. Donning it was a protest against the restrictions of that
freedom after 1819. But conservative scholars like Savigny and Puchta were neither students nor
radicals and did not necessarily endorse their agendas.
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to life is so central to his whole argument that he devotes a long chapter (Chapter Five, pp. 151-99) solely to its demonstration. Thus, in
evaluating Professor Whitman's argument, it is imperative to ask
whether this demonstration succeeds.
Professor Whitman chooses the professoriate's involvement in the
Agrarfrage, the issue of agrarian reform, to demonstrate how the Roman lawyers purposefully attempted to revivify ancient traditions. He
shows how historians like Niebuhr and lawyers like Savigny reformulated the historical account of the relationship between the ancient Roman and the medieval German peasantry (pp. 154-65). And he
explains how scholars like Savigny and Puchta reconceptualized the
law of real property by casting the old feudal concepts of Obereigentum and Untereigentum (superior and inferior property rights) into
the Roman molds of property and servitudes (pp. 165-89). This reformulation had important consequences because servitudes were subject
to prescription while (full) property rights were not. If the lord had
only a servitude in the peasant's land he could lose it by failing to
claim it. In other words, time could slowly erase feudal rights.
Professor Whitman's analysis is a tour de force through a highly
complex area of law and history, as well as an excellent illustration of
the interplay between scholarly debates and social issues. The problem is, of course, that in and of themselves these scholarly reconceptualizations do not demonstrate that the Roman lawyers pursued any
particular social or political agenda. On the face of their writings,
scholars like Savigny and Puchta employed Roman legal doctrine only
to conceptualize the legal aspects of the Agrarfrage, the rights and obligations of the peasantry vis-a-vis the landholding nobility. At least
openly, they argued only issues of law, not of politics. The hard question then is whether Professor Whitman's claim that they got involved
in the Agrarfrage for reasons beyond waging a "doctrinal battle
against feudalism" (p. 151) is warranted. To some extent, it probably
is. But we must, again, distinguish at least two different elements of
his claim.
Perhaps the more important element is Professor Whitman's assertion that the professors tried to show that land law could be reformed
through Roman doctrine without violent social disruptions. Roman
law professors could peacefully transform feudal rights and obligations
into modem property rights (pp. 198-99). Scholars like Savigny and
Puchta wanted to complete a "process by which learned law had
slowly eaten away the conceptual foundations of feudalism" (p. 186).
In short, they proffered legal reinterpretation to avoid political revolution. In this sense, they indeed wanted to revivify the Roman tradition
-the gradual and peaceful reform by the jurists through law (p. 158).
This element of Professor Whitman's interpretation of the professors'
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ambitions is an original and valuable contribution to our understanding of their ideas and goals.
But he ventures beyond that. He assumes that the professors employed the Roman law not only to demonstrate a method of social
change but also because they embraced the substantive goals of reform
- the concern beneath their scholarly debates was not only the maintenance of social peace but also the liberty of the peasantry itself. Professor Whitman portrays Savigny and Puchta as agrarian reformers
who made use of a (concealed) "tactic" (p. 161) - reconceptualizing
property law in Roman terms - in a "battle" (p. 185) for personal
freedom, a battle motivated by a "romantic Romanist love for the
peasantry" (p. 165). This claim is not only intrinsically implausible in
light of Savigny's political conservatism and social elitism, it is also
unsupported by convincing evidence. If Savigny, Puchta, or Thibaut
felt any such love for the peasantry, Professor Whitman fails to show
how they expressed it. 26 Even though Professor Whitman is right that
Savigny was not, as has often been assumed, hostile to the peasantry
(p. 166), there is still no evidence that he particularly cared for it
either. His self-styled aloofness actually speaks very much against
that. Perhaps there were indeed some "Romanists in the countryside
who believed they could free the peasantry" (p. 193), and Professor
Whitman refers to the efforts of some Hannoverian lawyers to do so
(pp. 190-93). But their occasional use of Savigny's ideas proves nothing about the latter's intentions, just as the reference by others to
Puchta (pp. 187-89) does not mean that he endorsed their efforts.
Professor Whitman's interpretation is dubious on yet another
ground. Even if Savigny and Puchta had wanted to free the peasantry,
the Romanist reconceptualization of feudal property rights would
have been a very questionable tool for that purpose. Roman property
law was by no means in and of itself beneficial to the peasants. It was
a two-edged sword that could be, and often was, used against them
instead of in their favor, as Professor Whitman openly admits (pp.
193-94). We can be sure that Savigny and Puchta were keenly aware
of that. Thus they had no reason to believe that casting property
rights in the forms of Roman law would necessarily promote the cause
of freedom, even had they pursued it. For these reasons, Professor
Whitman's conclusion that these scholars aimed to model modem social relations after ancient Rome so that "German peasants [would]
become plebeians" (p. 198), is neither proven nor inherently plausible.
Thus, the evidence does not always sufficiently support Professor
Whitman's broad thesis concerning the Roman law professors' common consciousness of, and shared longing for, both the sixteenth cen26. Perhaps others, like Niebuhr, Moser, or Zacharia did, but even that is far from clear. See
pp. 156-57, 159-60. And it says nothing about Savigny and Puchta themselves.
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tury and ancient Rome. The thesis is clearly proven in some respects,
still plausible in others, but in some respects it is neither.
IV.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

In judging the merits of a thesis about historical figures and events,
two criteria are particularly important. Does it add something important to our knowledge and understanding? And is it proven or made
at least plausible? As Parts I and II of this review show, the answer to
the former question is clearly yes. But as Part III indicates, the second
criterion is not met consistently. Thus the book has both strength and
weaknesses. They can be more clearly formulated by considering the
book from two different perspectives.
As a synthesis of ideas and as a proposal to view a piece of the past
in a certain light - in short, as a suggestive essay - the book deserves
high praise. It has all the qualities that matter in this regard. I hope
that my summary of its story and of its thesis has shown its originality
and perceptiveness. I fear that my summary did not show that it is
also incredibly wide-ranging in its content, rich in its insights, and subtle in many of its analyses. 27 For the purposes of a suggestive essay,
the evidence it contains is acceptable because it suffices to illustrate its
interpretation, to provoke thought, and to stimulate argument.
As a declaration of fact and as a demonstration of historical truth
- in short, as a definitive account - however, the book suffers from a
mismatch between the breadth and boldness of its thesis and the
patchiness and inconclusiveness of much of its proof. To be sure, the
weaknesses are by no means glaring, and only a fairly thorough inquiry illuminates the gaps and flaws in its evidence. But Professor
Whitman sometimes28 paints with a broad brush where finer lines
would render a more accurate picture.
Professor Whitman ultimately tries both to write an interpretive
essay with a provocative thesis, and to present a definitive account
proven by the facts. But to succeed at both endeavors at the same time
is very difficult because they call for different approaches, and the
strength of one can easily become the weakness of the other. The author of a definitive account must be meticulous, circumspect, and preoccupied with adducing evidence for every assertion, but he risks
boring the reader with factual detail and narrowly circumscribed conclusions. The suggestive essayist must provide grand synthesis and
imaginative interpretation in order to stimulate thought, but this
27. Several passages in the book are excellent little essays in their own right; see, for example,
the highly perceptive discussion of post-Napoleonic German politics, and especially of German
liberalism. Pp. 94-98.
28. I do not wish to create the misimpression that this is a pervasive flaw of the book. Much
of Professor Whitman's discussion is marked by admirable subtlety and careful differentiation.
But many of his major assertions are not.
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makes him vulnerable to the charge of speculation without definitive
proof.
The Legacy of the Roman Law must be evaluated in light of this
dilemma. On the whole, it seems quite clear though, that the strengths
of the suggestive essay outweigh the occasional weaknesses of the definitive account because the book opens new and highly interesting
perspectives with enough support to warrant serious consideration.
Thus it succeeds in its ultimate goal - to show that there was a lot
more to the Roman law in nineteenth-century Germany than just law.
To be sure, exactly how much more, and what it was, is open to further debate - but it will be a debate for which Professor Whitman has
laid the foundation and given the impetus.

